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ABSTRACT: 
Since the beginning of the new millennium, a great variety of experiences of monetary innovation has tak-
en place worldwide. Actually, very assorted types of social agents, at very different levels of interaction 
and with very diverse purposes and results, are creating a plethora of global, macro-regional, local or de-
territorialized currencies seriously defying both the hegemonic role of the US dollar, and the traditional 
agents, methods and criteria related to money’s creation and circulation. 
Given such a picture, the main aim of this essay is to characterize and valuate the principle features of the 
ongoing process of monetary innovation, in light of its modern and contemporary history. We adopt an 
interdisciplinary theoretical frame, based on the ground of the political sociology and the world system 
theory, and a genealogical method focused on the monetary history of the United States. The main result 
here presented is the centrality of the dialectic between innovation and regulation, and of their social and 
institutional forces. Actually, it can help the comprehension about where, when and why new forms of 
money appear, as well as the individuation of the main traits characterizing the current stage of global cri-
sis and of its risky implications. 
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1. Introduction: 
 
Since the beginning of the new millennium, and especially after the 2007-2008 fi-
nancial crisis, a great variety of experiences of monetary innovation have taken place 
worldwide, promoted by very assorted types of social agents, at very different levels of 
social interaction and with very diverse purposes and results. The core relevance of 
those multiple experiences lies in the fact that all of them tend to determine the fol-
lowing situation. On the one hand, they create a plethora of either counterhegemonic 
macro-regional currencies, or distinctly local or even at all de-territorialized ones, 
which reinforce the dispute over the role played by the US dollar as hegemonic global 
money; on the other hand, and in more general terms, they call into question at a 
more general level the role and validity of the traditional agents, methods and criteria 
related to money’s creation and circulation.  
Such heterogeneous expressions of monetary innovation acquire even greater rele-
vance as we adopt a larger historical perspective. At first sight, they seem to contrast 
the global tendency, consolidated during most part of the last five centuries, to the re-
duction, simplification and homogenization of monetary forms, relations and functions. 
Nevertheless, the interlacement and convergence of financialization and digitalization 
of social life seems, on the contrary, to be secretly unifying the essential structure of 
money, and even altering its very essence and socio-political function. In fact, money 
tends to become a mere algorithmic procedure and a pure digital entity, either auto-
matically or willingly created. This implicates the radical transmutation of the relation-
ship with the information that, at the same time, money is, absorbs, entails and trans-
mits during its circulation, regardless of which particular form – among those currently 
possible – each specific currency takes. 
Given such a picture, our study starts from the assumed evidence that monetary in-
novation today represents one of the main battlegrounds within which a crucial phase 
of the ongoing social struggle is played, affecting both the micro-physical level of pow-
er relations, and the macro-regional and geopolitical ones. In our view, that phenome-
non is expressions of, immanent to, and conditioned by two different but closely inter-
twined dynamics, and one more general circumstance. The first one consists of the 
long-term process of monetization and financialization of ever increasing aspects of so-
cial and individual lives, which is functional to perpetrate and optimize capital accumu-
lation. The second dynamic coincides with the most recent process of digitalization 
which – especially when it appears interconnected with the previous trend – basically 
expresses the systemic need to explore, fine-tune and provide to the global society the 
new relational means made possible, adequate and by now required by the new social 
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ambits and structures that ICTs create, also in terms of monetary relations. Finally, it is 
to be considered the circumstance that both processes are significantly immersed with-
in the new disputed geopolitical equilibrium, potently shaken by the trend of exhaus-
tion of the long Western hegemonic cycle, as well as by the attempt, headed by the US, 
to contrast decline also by using some instruments of monetary innovation (Arrighi and 
Silver 1999; Arrighi 1994). The combination of these three elements strongly contrib-
utes to define the very matrix of the present, which is profoundly revolutionizing so 
many ambits of our life. The decisive importance of the open and ambivalent process 
of monetary innovation consists of being situated at the very core of these three 
movements, either favoring or contrasting the by now factual “post-democratic” turn 
currently affecting the main socio-political structures (Crouch 2004). Actually, some 
experiences of monetary innovation represent the very direct counter-face of the pro-
cess of capital valorization (that though tries to take advantage of them), being the re-
sult of the intense contradictions that accumulation generates and spreads out 
throughout the global society. From this angle, monetary innovation partially manifests 
the new capability, collectively acquired, to use technologies and financial tools in or-
der to support the formation of better social structures of production and distribution 
of collective wealth. Nevertheless, the risk is that even its “best” practices and samples 
may unintentionally contribute to build, or be captured by, the structural conjunction 
between the darkest features of the platform economy (Kenney and Zysman 2016) and 
the degenerative logics of “datacracy” (de Kerckhove 2016; Gambetta ed. 2018), within 
a generalizable new model of “surveillance capitalism” (Zuboff 2018). 
With the awareness of such perilous implications in the background, the main aim of 
this essay is to characterize and valuate the ongoing principle features of monetary in-
novation, in light of its modern and contemporary history. We adopt an interdiscipli-
nary theoretical frame, based on the ground of the political sociology and the world 
system theory, articulated on the spatial-temporal dimension of the global scenario 
and the longue durée. This purpose requires, firstly, to resume and contextualize the 
principal traits, elements, and factors distinguishing past and current manifestations of 
the phenomenon, also by referring to some exemplary cases. Secondly, it entails the 
effort to emphasize the leading arguable tendency of that, in light of and in relation to 
the historical transformation of the overall structure of powers, markets and society.  
Our arguments are oriented to give some not-exhaustive answers to the set of fun-
damental questions about where, when and why new forms of money appear. In par-
ticular, we will go through these interrogations by putting into action a genealogic ap-
proach, inspired by the work of Michel Foucault, aimed at challenging and comple-
menting traditional practices of social sciences, by displacing the epistemological pri-
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macy of the subject, and targeting instead the wider mechanisms hidden behind dis-
courses, reasons, rationalities effectively in motion through history (Crowley 2009, 2). 
By adopting these particular focus and methods, the main result of the essay will con-
sist of highlighting the centrality of the dialectic between social and institutional forces 
pushing respectively monetary innovation and regulation, in order to contribute to the 
comprehension of the current stage of global crisis. As we will show, such a perspective 
can be tracked down already in Aristotle’s conception of money as nomisma, and clear-
ly identified through the US economic history. Hence, throughout the following para-
graphs, we will discuss and fix some crucial elements and dynamics characteristic of 
the principle historical and present manifestations of monetary innovation. In particu-
lar, after a definition of the ontological and political valence of money, we will genea-
logically analyze within which geopolitical context the crucial traits of modern mone-
tary innovation arose and developed, especially focusing on the extraordinary labora-
tory of colonial and post-colonial North America. Then, we will explore some essential 
directions by and towards which the overall phenomenon is currently stimulated and 
leading up to. Some general conclusive considerations will be finally exposed. 
 
 
2. Money and its essential political and ontological nature 
 
The most decisive significance of “money” – we believe – is expressed by that an-
cient philosophical truth fixed by Aristotle in the IV century B.C., in the first book of Pol-
itics (Pol.), consisting of the recognition of the essential social/political nature of hu-
man beings1. In a nutshell, it means that no one can be ever sufficient unto themselves, 
but also that society – the inescapable cooperative network that implicates one other – 
has a changing character, subjected to the stress and jolting determined by the exer-
cise of human forces and interests, of which money has become one of the principle 
vectors of realization. 
More specifically, it is in the fifth book of Nicomachean Ethics (NE) where the Greek 
thinker developed the anthropological conception highlighting money’s crucial role in 
the effective constitution of any concrete “community”, by providing the possibility of 
exchanging things among individuals and groups. In particular, in a paragraph dedicat-
ed to the issue of justice as a matter of reciprocity and proportions, Aristotle states 
that all goods must have a monetary price as a basis of a generalized commensurabil-
 
1 According to Aristotle, «social instinct is implanted in all men by nature», and besides «it is evident 
that the state [intended as society] is a creation of nature, and that man is by nature a political animal» 
(Pol., part II).  
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ity, which, in its turn, is the very precondition of society: «for then there will always be 
exchange, and if so, association of man with man. Money, then, acting as a measure, 
makes goods commensurate and equates them; for neither would there have been as-
sociation if there were not exchange, nor exchange if there were not equality, nor 
equality if there were not commensurability» (NE, V, 5). It is for the end of creating 
universal interchangeability, proportions, and reciprocity among all items, «that money 
has been introduced, and it becomes in a sense an intermediate; for it measures all 
things, and therefore the excess and the defect» (NE, V, 5). It is so because money 
(nomisma), that «exists not by nature but by law (nomos)», is «by convention a sort of 
representative of demand» (NE, V, 5). Actually, it is the latter – which represents all 
sort of individual and social needs, wills, and desires – what «holds all things together 
(for if men did not need one another’s goods at all, or did not need them equally, there 
would be either no exchange or not the same exchange)» (NE, V, 5). 
Thus, money appears as one of the main extrinsic objects through which human be-
ings’ social essence realizes itself. Besides, precisely because money exists by virtue of 
nomos rather than by nature, it is also one of the main manifestations and tools of real-
ization of human beings’ political essence. It means that thought oriented to socio-
political phenomena must look with much accuracy at this institution: nomisma insti-
tuted and regulated by the nomos, (so) that «it is in our power to change it and [even 
to] make it useless» (NE, V, 5). As such, in particular, money is quite inherent political 
sociology’s constitutive interests, and worthy of its specific attention. Moreover, Aris-
totle above seems to suggest a further reason of crucial relevance of money, useful for 
understanding critical turning points of history. Actually, if it is undoubtedly logic and 
true that the existence of a concrete community is the chronological precondition of 
any political act founding and regulating money, it is also correct and sometime neces-
sary to recognize that the latter is an operative vector concretely generating new forms 
and dimensions of society. Such an ontological valence of money (Amato 2010; Busce-
ma and Lucarelli 2013), that goes far beyond its “simply” social and political nature, 
was already explicit for Aristotle: «there will be no exchange and no intercourse» (NE, 
V, 5) without money’s capacity of determining a condition of almost universal measur-
ability, commensurability, interchangeability. In summary, money is not only an eco-
nomic element, but first of all a social and political entity; in addition, money is not just 
a means differently available to individuals for the expression of their needs, will, and 
desires, but also something here especially relevant as a principle of social reality. 
Largely predating the advent of the capitalist mode of production and governing, 
such dimension of money has not been scratched by the historical development of the 
latter. On the contrary, money is an indispensable tool for the dynamics of which capi-
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talism essentially consists: the socialization virtually of every human thing, act, or in-
stance; the generalization of the relations of exploitation realizing an ever increasing 
concentration of power and richness. Moreover, we can say that capitalism, in its turn, 
has completely developed the double consistency of money, which is implicit in the 
two senses suggested by the Latin etymon of the word: on the one hand, it is moneta2, 
meant as «place for coining money, mint; coined money, money, coinage»; while, on 
the other, it is the sign of a monitor, understood to be an «admonishing goddess», 
from the verb monere meaning «advise, warn, admonish» (Online Etymological Dic-
tionary). Actually, capitalism continuously transfigures money in a double-faced entity: 
on the one hand, it manifests itself as currency, literally intended3 as a representation 
of value that flows deeply through almost all type of social relations and all sort of hu-
man interaction; while on the other it becomes denarius4, intended as Money that, 
once reached a certain degree of accumulation, realizes a qualitative jump, that trans-
forms it for its owners in a potential instrument of command and influence of collective 
will and behavior. These two dimensions are hardly distinguishable from each other, 
being exactly – we would say – the two sides of a same coin that precisely works under 
the rule of such an ambiguous duplicity. 
As Mark Bloch and Fernand Braudel suggested, money is an amazing indicator of the 
directions and qualities of the ongoing transformations (Perna 2014). In particular, em-
phasizing the political nature and the ontological dimension of money, is a way to rec-
ognize the importance of the monetary innovation phenomenon in its more general 
terms. Now, we have to refer to the specific historic and geopolitical frame within 
which the monetary innovation process has gotten its modern and contemporary 
traits. Actually, it will help us to recognize their concrete relevance in our contingency – 
characterized by a very severe crisis of the world system’s hegemonic structure, and by 
an impasse of the cyclical dynamics regenerating new effective capacity of accumula-
tion and order. 
 
 
 
 
 
2 Moneta was a title of the Roman goddess Juno. Actually, in Rome, coins were minted close to her 
temple, where it seems that, besides, precious metals were stored.  
3 Based on its Latin etymon “curraunt”, that means in circulation.  
4 According to the Online Etymological Dictionary, «short for denarius nummus "the coin containing ten 
(aces)," from deni- "by tens," from decem "ten"», i.e. a coin of greater value being the summation of oth-
ers.  
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3. Once Upon a Time in America 
 
Experience of modern and contemporary history has thought us that the essential 
relationship already grasped by Aristotle, linking money and the political institutional 
activity that constitutes and regulates it, is very articulated and dynamic. In order to try 
to better define the specific terms of such a relation, here we choose to follow the rea-
soning proposed by Richard Sylla in his Monetary innovation in America, meaningfully 
published at the beginning of the 1980s – a crucial period for the matter in question. 
Consistently with the genealogical method here adopted, this essay helps us to individ-
uate the complex landscape of social and institutional forces, mechanisms, motives, 
conditions and circumstances from, or against, which the specific elements of the cur-
rent wave of monetary innovation emerge and act. 
Characterized by an approach of economic history, the abovementioned article de-
fines monetary innovation as the response that socioeconomic forces normally give to 
the challenges posed by those circumstances in which: «Adherence to regulation would 
increase instability and constrain growth and development to lower levels than would 
be possible under alternative arrangements» (Sylla 1982, 22). In those conditions, 
monetary innovation represents the «rational, purposive activity motivated by per-
ceived economic opportunities and directed toward utility maximization», whose main-
ly beneficial effects consist in removing «what otherwise would have been most seri-
ous constraints» on development (Sylla 1982, 25). Nevertheless, the concrete unfolding 
of monetary innovation, in its turn, could create «instability and negative externality» 
by producing exactly the criticality opposite to those characterizing the starting condi-
tions, «that would arise from too much money and price-level inflation» (Sylla 1982, 
22). Hence, it means that although, on the one hand, monetary innovation usually is a 
phenomenon «carried out to overcome the constraints on economic development im-
posed by existing regulations», on the other, each concrete phase of innovation de-
termines «a demand for new regulations in order to avoid» (Sylla 1982, 22) or manage 
the corresponding negative side effects.  
Thus, emerging from that is the image of a pendulum, describing a dialectical rela-
tionship, in which monetary innovation «is accompanied or shortly followed by new 
regulations»; so that its story therefore consists of the interaction between the at-
tempts to overcome the «constraints on real development implicit in an existing mone-
tary system and the regulations society designs to avoid excessive money creation» 
(Sylla 1982, 22). 
Against the tradition of study usually carried out by economy historians – dispropor-
tionately «more concerned with the [negative] effects of monetary innovation than 
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with its causes», and in particular with its inflationary side effects –, Sylla auspicates 
the adoption of an epistemological perspective rather focused on the determinants of 
such a phenomenon, and able to answer the general question about «why new forms 
of money appear when and where they do» (Sylla 1982, 21). To this end, he applies the 
«demand-induced innovation thesis» (Sylla 1982, 24) to the analysis of the case of the 
British North American colonies, especially during the century and half before the 
American Revolution. More specifically, according to that thesis, the creation of new 
forms of money represents the recurrent solution, systematically emerged in that em-
blematic case, to the persistent relative deficiency of means of exchange due to restric-
tive political regulations: precisely, «Whatever English money the colonists brought 
with them or gained in other ways was returned to the mother country almost as 
quickly as it came in» (Sylla 1982, 23). In more general terms, Sylla identifies the prob-
lem with the structural condition that «traditional moneys, gold and silver, were either 
unavailable or available in insufficient amounts to sustain» growth in that peculiar con-
text: «in all likelihood […] the most rapidly growing economy in the world of the seven-
teenth and eighteenth century», but also pressured by «the growing financial require-
ments of colonial governments» (Sylla 1982, 23-24). Monetary innovation was the cre-
ative collective solution to the combination of these two elements, adopted for ful-
filling demand for money. 
Now, it is focal to stress the relevance of some analytical elements that Sylla’s sober 
considerations consider, but somehow underestimating them. In reality, they are cru-
cial insofar as they contribute to highlight that the dialectical interaction between 
money innovation and regulation is not politically neutral,  being constantly driven and 
prompted by the interplay of the contingent power relations animated by the social 
groups involved in each concrete process. Thus, the first element to be stressed is the 
evidence that colonial propensity to monetary innovation has been fostered by the fact 
that restrictions to creative local practices mainly came from Britain. Actually, since the 
Seventeenth century, Great Britain exerted its control over the American colonies by 
limiting money supply and prohibiting to mint local coins; moreover, it forced them to 
use only mother country’s money and to redeem it just for English goods. Emblematic 
example of the reactions to the innovating responses that people in colonies adopted 
in order to overcome the imposed restrictions, are the 1751 and 1764 Currency Acts 
emanated in London, which «applied stringent limitations on fiat paper issues in New 
England, [considered] the chief offending region» (Sylla 1982, 26). Definitively, the first 
monetary innovation in North America grew on such an international political ground 
characterized by relationships of subjection to the mother country, conferring to those 
experimental practices their “subversive” implications.  
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Besides, from Sylla’s description, we can stress another crucial element which oth-
erwise would remain tacit. Colonists seem to have «turned to an ingenious variety of 
experiments to provide local media of exchange» also because stimulated by the ex-
traordinary complexity peculiar of that social environment, crossed by flows of re-
sources linking many faraway parts of the world, and characterized by an uncommonly 
rich juxtaposition of different cultures. Among those experiments: «One was the adop-
tion of the wampum, the token shell money of the native Indians. Commodity money–
corn, rice, tobacco, and beaver pelts, for example–were also granted monetary status. 
Precious metallic moneys gained mostly from trade with Spanish America circulated in 
the colonies, and some attempts were made to provide local coinages from inflows of 
bullion. Extensive use of so-called book credit also has been documented. The most no-
table achievement, however, was the innovation of the first fiat paper moneys in the 
western world» (Sylla 1982, 23).  
It is by virtue of such a variety of manifestations, that Sylla considers hard «to find a 
place and time in which there was more monetary innovation» (1982, 23) and this case 
as «a near perfect example» of its practice (1982, 25). Actually, the unique social and 
cultural complexity characterizing that dynamical context, seems to explain why «all of 
this monetary innovation [took] place on a periphery far removed from the heart of 
western civilization» (Sylla 1982, 23). 
Economic historians generally called into question alternative analytical explanations 
in order to give reason of the exuberant tones that innovation of new varied forms of 
money had taken in that context. Namely, they are: «an unfavorable balance of trade 
[that] drained specie from the colonies and necessitated a search for money substi-
tutes»; the development of a precursory diffused perception of monetary innovations’ 
function as a provider of «measures to overcome depressions and stimulate trade»; 
the «aversion to taxes» imposed by the mother country that led local governments «to 
paper “currency finance”»; the need to use the latter in order «to finance [the] numer-
ous wars [waged] against the French and the Indians» (Sylla 1982, 23). Nevertheless, 
for Sylla these factors – considered as secondary – became especially important in that 
context because of its determinants, already identified: the double pressure exerted by 
a «decidedly modern» economic rate of growth (1982, 24) and by growing financial re-
quirements. 
After the colonial era, American economy’s demand for money grew even faster 
than before, but within a monetary regime characterized by limitations now endoge-
nously imposed by the ‘founding fathers’. In fact, the experience of the paper issues 
used to finance the War of Independence – so excessive that by 1781 they «had be-
come essentially worthless» –, motivated the Constitutional declaration «that thence-
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forth gold and silver were the only legal tenders and that no state was ever again to is-
sue fiat paper money» (Sylla 1982, 26). This meant the reintroduction of a constriction 
on development that had been abundantly overcome by colonial Americans through 
the monetary innovation’s practices. Interestingly, it was a financial innovation, con-
sisting of the autonomous adoption of the European modern model of commercial 
banking, the way to overcome that restraint this once. In fact, «Although states could 
no longer create paper money, they could create banks that in turn created liabilities in 
the form of notes and deposits serving the same purposes»: id est, «to supply at rela-
tively modest expense an unprecedented demand for money that was far beyond the 
capacity of existing stocks of gold and silver to meet» (Sylla 1982, 26). 
The new monetary structure, based on the equilibrium between the gold standard 
and the banking system, had been de facto transfigured during the Civil War, when the 
need to finance impellent huge expenditures, determined the decision to diffuse abun-
dant «paper moneys in the form of legal tender U.S. notes (the greenbacks) and na-
tional bank notes into the monetary base» (Sylla 1982, 27). This meant that «the gold 
standard became a relic earlier than most analysts assume»; it «became more a symbol 
than a reality [already] in the post-bellum United States» when it «ended in practice» 
not in force of an institutional decision, but of the public reaction after the Civil War. In 
fact, while understandably worried about the convertibility of its bank money into 
those new forms of paper, if we exclude «one or two brief exceptions», people «did 
not exhibit any strong desire even during financial panics to convert the new forms of 
paper currency into gold». Hence, it was just «an almost mythological attachment» 
simply to the idea of the gold standard that prevented its formal abolition – what the 
Civil War paper innovations, instead, positively realized in practice (Sylla 1982, 27). 
Nevertheless, given such an «inflexible, if not exactly gold, standard» post-bellum 
regime, that saddled for a long period deeper monetary innovation, it was on the diffu-
sion of further new banking activities, on the upper stratum of financial innovation, 
that relied the demand for money determined by development. In fact, Sylla notices 
that, in «this atmosphere of regulatory constraints, private, unincorporated banks 
flourished even more than they did before 1860. And when the states, toward the end 
of the century, relaxed some of their own regulatory constraints on banks, the state 
systems surpassed in a number of respects the national system that had been intended 
to replace them. The result was a system made up of thousands of independent units–
national banks, state-chartered commercial and saving banks, trust companies, and 
private banks» (1982, 28). 
A combination of restrictive banking regulation, inflexible monetary standard, along 
with a dynamic of rapid development, contributed to determine the secular deflation 
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of the late Nineteenth century. This, in its turn, fostered the need for searching a quick 
way to expand the monetary base, especially for facing the short-run problems typical 
of the financial panics. Sylla refers to the foundation and development of the Federal 
Reserve – a new institution devoted to issue currency and bank reserves in order to 
solve this problem – as a great manifestation of «American penchant for monetary in-
novation» deeply and diffusedly rooted into the above-considered colonial experience 
(1982, 29). We think that such an event represents a milestone for the comprehension 
of the most recent history of monetary innovation, given its long-run implications and 
further evolutions, and the criticalities since then posed. In fact, «Fed’s power to create 
new money with the stroke of a pen meant that in principle the old problem of eco-
nomic development being constrained by inadequate provision for monetary growth 
within existing arrangements had been overcome» (Sylla 1982, 29). Actually, in the 
past century monetary restrictions had no longer been a serious obstacle for develop-
ment, while «a lack of restraint on money creation has become a new problem». The 
search for new solutions to it represented important parts of the debate of the time to 
which Sylla refers – solutions which are to be considered, according to the dialectical 
movement identified between monetary innovation and regulation, as «lineal de-
scendants of the Currency Act of 1750 and 1764 as well as of the old gold standard» 
(1982, 29). 
Now, given the fact that Sylla objectively shared the US’ perspective, concretely situ-
ated within that historical geopolitical context, he can be considered as a witness of 
the starting phase of the new and unusual wave of monetary innovation mostly un-
leashed from the Seventies of the Twentieth century by the hegemonic global actor in 
response to that peculiar contingency. It is interesting that within that debate, he op-
poses monetarist historians’ attitude «of attributing the U.S. inflationary trends of this 
century to the Fed», by leveraging on his perspective of study focused on the agents 
and dynamics of monetary innovation. In particular, from this angle we can appreciate 
a very relevant structural novelty: «Some of the long-term real forces that historically 
generated a growing demand for money no longer are as strong as they were in the 
American past. Population and labor force growth, for example, are not what they 
once were. The impetus to money demand that came from increased specialization, 
intermediate transactions, and market exchange is less than before, largely because a 
developed economy has approached saturation levels on these fronts. Modern tech-
nology and business organization may even have reversed some of these trends; […] 
more and more important economic activities that once were coordinated by markets 
and monetary transactions are now internalized within large corporations» (Sylla 1982, 
29). (Such a “new” structural condition, some decades later, seems to have become 
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peculiar of the entire world. In fact, now: demographic growth is evolving under a con-
trolled path; a naïve conception of development and consumption is destined to disap-
pear also because of the environmental global concerns; many important forms of so-
cial cooperation and services’ provision, due to the development of the world wide 
web, have become a huge sphere of unpaid work or demonetized exchange). So, this is 
the first altered factor that motivates Sylla to consider as anomalous, in relation to the 
past US history, that new incipient wave of monetary innovation. Actually, the latter, 
differently than it was, has been characterized by a structural quite moderate growth 
of the demand for money coming from the real economy’s forces. If monetary innova-
tion has nonetheless proceeded, in spite of the fact that «most of the real demand 
forces that historically induced [it,] may have tapered off in our era», it seems to have 
been the result of two relatively new features. Firstly, from then until today – despite 
the dominant narrative about the essence of neoliberalism –, monetary demand com-
ing from the government increased – complementing or substituting traditional forces 
– for it seems now «unable to raise all of the revenue it needs through taxation and 
thus resorts to deficits financed by money creation». Although colonial experience 
demonstrated that «Such a practice need not be inflationary», in the circumstances of 
the twentieth-century «however, it has led to inflation» (Sylla 1982, 29), in particular of 
the US dollars circulating through the world. Indeed, far from being unique, such a dy-
namic is typical all those severe war contingencies along the intense US history. So, 
meaningfully, it has been the State again the first main actor of the new wave of mone-
tary innovation which has accompanied the great part of the period of the Cold War, as 
well as the subsequent phase of aggressive expansion of neoliberalism throughout the 
world.  
Secondly, the other force propelling de facto such a new wave has been the non-
bank financial institutions They have «gained competitive ground […] by innovating 
new near moneys», taking advantage of the circumstance determined by the net im-
pact of the ’30s depression-engendered regulations, which had reduced «the ability of 
the banking system to innovate and compete in the money and capital markets» – alt-
hough «banks, of course, have not entirely been left behind in the recent wave of 
monetary innovation» (Sylla 1982, 30), and lately have gained back great part of their 
competitiveness. 
State, through regulation, «has always played a supporting role in inducing mone-
tary innovation» (Sylla 1982, 29) and managing it. But this time, it has had a double 
crucial role, being: once a main demander of money, beside its main creator; and the 
other the regulator/deregulator of the banking and financial sectors’ ability to issue 
new forms of near money. 
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According to the demand-induced innovation thesis, if «These more recent forms of 
monetary innovation have resulted from regulation rather than the demands of real 
economic development», it means that they are significantly wasteful «even when they 
improve an existing situation». In fact, whereas «the demand-induced monetary inno-
vations of past history […] augmented both resources and the efficiency of their use», 
on the contrary, modern regulation diverts precious forces from real development, giv-
en that «itself absorbs substantial resources and causes still more scarce resources to 
go into the innovative efforts that are made to get around the regulations» (Sylla 1982, 
30). 
Sylla concludes his reasoning noticing that «It is something of a paradox that Ameri-
cans of this century, who have come so close to making monetary innovation unneces-
sary for purposes of sustaining their further economic development, should give the 
innovative process such great and unneeded incentives through regulation» (1982, 30). 
But such a paradox becomes illusory whether: a) we insert the dialectic between mon-
etary innovation and regulation individuated along the US economic history, within the 
radical scheme of reasoning – elucidated above – elaborated by Aristotle; b) we reflect 
on the whole picture considering the wider geopolitical schema stemming from the 
world-system theory and analytical method. Actually, the first operation induces us to 
recognize that the last wave of monetary innovation, call into question more directly 
the very ontological role that political power plays on this matter: insofar as the State – 
instead of limiting itself, as usual, to the more ordinary regulative activities – confis-
cates to collectivity and exerts by itself the constitutive prerogative on money, by 
changing currencies’ essential design, modes of emission and of circulation. Moreover, 
the second operation abovementioned calls into question the specific historical and in-
ternational framework within which the last wave of monetary innovation matures and 
evolves, characterized – when Sylla reflects – by the orchestrated attempts to organize 
a strategy of reaction to the first robust signs of a possible coming exhaustion and de-
cline of the US hegemonic power over the world. 
 
 
4. Good-Buy America? 
 
The thesis here adopted judges the “paradoxical” vicissitudes of the last process of 
monetary innovation, as the result of the US attempt to utilize the strongly rooted and 
highly improved aptitude towards monetary and financial engineering and design, cul-
tivated along the modern American history, for two key purposes. Firstly, containing 
and managing the main manifestations of its diminishing international dominance; 
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secondly, trying to reinvigorate its supremacy on a new “elementary” sphere of action, 
transnational and virtually global, where to reconstitute new preeminent social and 
power relations. Actually, besides the military ambit, another principal factor of 
strength still sustaining the US international supremacy is precisely based on those 
specific strategic knowledge, competitive ability and effective tools of power originated 
exactly within the process of monetary innovation that, along the centuries, took place 
on such a “periphery”, far removed from where the heart of Western civilization was 
located in the middle of modernity. Once entered in a state of serious crisis, the US he-
gemony seemed to have reacted by concentrating its core strategies of survival and re-
vitalization on their historically improved abilities to enforce and manage monetary in-
novation at a global level, on the one hand; while, on the other, on the constitution of 
a new utopian “periphery” of the world, which is the info-sphere5 (Floridi 2009) – con-
stituted by the internet, all the social networks and those electronic and digital ambits 
and realities in which great part of our analogical and mental existence has been up-
load and transmigrated. In such a new ambit, new extreme experiments of reconfigu-
ration of the social and political structure are underway, so continuing the innovation 
of those ancient arts of ‘banks games’ and carom that permitted Europe and the US to 
realize their half a millennium experience of supremacy over the world. Obviously, 
both of these strategies are guaranteed, accompanied and propelled by the fundamen-
tal residual core of dominance of the US, which is their undoubted military preemi-
nence. Within this frame, the realm of the monetary innovation process, in interaction 
with the possibilities opened by the inflation of the new digitalized info-sphere, repre-
sents a preeminent and strategic battleground of the global competition and struggle, 
where macro-, meso-, and micro-physical social and power relations are being rede-
fined in order to try to configure the pivotal terms for launching a new systemic cycle 
of accumulation. 
The relevance here attributed to the economic history of North America is due to 
this: it can be usefully considered a sort of matrix of the multiple phenomena of mone-
tary innovation characterizing the whole contemporary global scenario. Actually, start-
ing from that, we can design the following assorted and articulated scheme of compre-
hension and interpretation of its current manifestations. From the excursus based on 
Sylla’s analysis and conclusion, we can extrapolate and deduce two main different 
types of monetary innovation.  
 
5 Partially inspired to the concept of bio-sphere, Floridi’s conception of info-sphere can be synthetized 
as the semantic space made of all the existing documents (codified data or knowledge), their agents (hu-
mans, institutions or software interacting with the documents) and the operations of which their mutual 
relations consist (2009).  
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The first is the one induced by real economic forces, whose perceived opportunities 
and pursued interests determine a demand for money markedly exceeding its concrete 
availability according to the enforced regulation. It is a creative diffused phenomenon, 
fostered by very heterogeneous social and cultural impulses and instances. It has to do 
with the expedients of the collective intelligence matured within what Braudel named 
“material life”, and to its relation with the upper layer: the market. It also represents a 
way to resist to and elude the specific relations of power that each concrete existing 
monetary regime implicates, especially when the power exercising the regulative func-
tion on money is perceived as external and usurper. Within the above-realized excur-
sus, such a type of innovation greatly corresponds to the colonial phase of the North 
American monetary history, the one preceding the Independence from the British 
mother country – the source of the power using monetary regulation primarily as a 
tool for performing its “extracting” prerogative on the colonial socioeconomic excep-
tional vitality. It is a bottom-up model, emerging at the margin of the political structure 
governing society and of its regulative instruments, imprinted by social creativity and 
the impulse to overcome rules perceived as restrictive, irrational, and detrimental. This 
first type is especially applicable to that great part of the current phenomenon of mon-
etary innovation creating and diffusing the existing plethora of means of exchange 
conceived and designed to enable potential and otherwise frustrated economic forces, 
sited at the margin of the global social structure. Examples of these are complementary 
currencies, local and solidary moneys, banks of time, and all those tools used to mobi-
lize and valorize resources in order either to overcome the lack or local unavailability of 
ordinary monetary instruments, either to elude the detrimental effects due to the use 
of ordinary monetary and financial tools. Referring to the dynamic started in Italy dur-
ing the XIII century, Bloch coined the expression of «monetary revolution» (1981, 56-
59). Giving account of the more than five thousand local currencies actually existing in 
the world, and of the other main phenomena characterizing the current process of 
monetary innovation, Perna recalls that formula to refer to the broader new monetary 
revolution (2014, 123). It proceeds through a pincer movement, from above and from 
below, and is animated by very heterogeneous subjects and agents, substantially in-
tended to regain people’s control over money, or to re-equilibrate international mone-
tary and power relations. Moreover, if the extraordinary process of modern monetary 
innovation took place in those geographical margins described by Sylla, and considered 
by Marx as still «real Colonies»6, great part of the most intense dynamics characterizing 
 
6 Interestingly, in the chapter of the first book of Das Kapital focused on «The Modern Theory of Coloni-
sation», Marx gives a ‘substantial’ definition of those peripheries of the world, including North America, 
typified by abundant «virgins soils, colonized by free immigrants» and more or less freely available to 
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such a matter today is occurring in the new peripheries in which the info-sphere is ar-
ticulated or through the utilization of its instruments. In an earlier phase, they repre-
sented the new real colonies located at the margins of the dominant social structure, 
and hence very favorable ambits for the experimentation of emancipatory projects 
leveraged on different practices of monetary innovation, or of radical redesigning of 
money based on the novel block-chain technology. However, lately, the successful 
strategy of aggressive colonization of these new domains by the rigged forces of finan-
cialized and digitalized capitalism – like in the emblematic cases of the Big Four corpo-
rations of the platform economy (Facebook, Google, Apple, Amazon) –, is misappropri-
ating or subsuming many of those alternative experimental types of monetary tools. By 
this way, the ongoing process conferring to money new unprecedented forms, capaci-
ties, and possible outlooks, is concurring to the arrangement of the new features of the 
coming dominating structure of power in a vary ambiguous manner. 
Another type of monetary innovation distinctly emerging from the historic vicissi-
tudes of North America, is the one – right opposite to the previous type – consisting of 
the acts of the political power which produces by itself and introduces to the monetary 
base additive significant quantities or completely new forms of means of exchange. 
Here the propelling source is a political central institution which considers opportune 
or necessary to buy, through fiat money, a certain considerable amount of goods and 
services, usually pressed by the urgency posed by a highly risky or dramatic situation, 
determined by circumstances of conflicts, economic crises or financial panic. Such a 
top-down schema usually has a net inflationary effect and deteriorates the quality of 
money, which tends to rely almost completely on the political responsibility undertak-
en by the State institutions and on their possibility of legitimately using violence, inter-
nally or externally, as a last resort able to suspend the ordinary economic principles. 
Within the above-realized excursus, such a type of innovation greatly corresponds to 
the monetary policies adopted by the colonial governments, the States or the Federal 
powers in occasions of the conflicts against the French troupes and the Indians, the In-
dependence War, the Civil War. From this angle, the institution of the Federal Reserve 
is a threshold event: long-run effect of the causes of the late Nineteenth century’s 
Great Depression; but also, first necessary step for determining the current status and 
features of fiat money. Therefore, such a type of monetary innovation is especially ap-
plicable to that crucial event occurred in 1971, when Nixon unilaterally determined the 
effective inoperability of the Bretton Woods system of international financial ex-
 
them. Because of this, there capitalism had to experiment for a long time new ways, methods and tools to 
succeed. From this perspective, almost one century after their political independence, «The United States 
are, speaking economically, still only a Colony of Europe» (Marx 1867, 545).  
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change, by suspending its key component: the convertibility of the US dollar to gold, 
supposedly until that system would have been reformed. After few attempts resulted 
unsuccessful, in 1973 the architrave of the Bretton Woods system could have been 
considered ultimately cancelled, and the whole post-bellum international financial ex-
change regime de facto replaced by the one currently in force, based on freely floating 
fiat currencies. Interestingly, such a decision was accompanied by a wider consistent 
series of political-economic resolutions intended to fight increasing inflation, especially 
by freezing wages and prices. Actually, what Sylla considers as a wasteful, abnormal, 
and paradoxical type of monetary innovation, because directly driven by the regulative 
power, in our view represents one of the main elements of a precise political strategy: 
the foundations of neoliberalism and of its global rush. 
Moreover, here we can see the historical inversion of the usual relation between the 
two main factors of inflation. In particular, in order to concentrate resources on the 
geopolitical challenge against the Soviet contender and, at the same time, to repress 
the acute internal conflicts characteristic of that stage of western history, the US gov-
ernment decided to drastically reform the structural relationship of concurrence be-
tween the two bigger demander of money and sources of inflation: public institutions – 
especially those designed to manage the legitimate internal and international use of 
violence, much needy of resources because of the highly risky contingency –, and the 
real economic forces – whose interplay was then particularly conflictive. Hence, in or-
der to grant the sustainability of the demand for money coming by the governmental 
decisions, and the overall phenomenon of the US dollar’s inflation on the global scenar-
io, it was considered necessary to orchestrate and articulate a general deflationary 
strategy consisting above all of the compression of social rights and welfare instances, 
and the externalization of the most negative side effects of capitalist development. 
Under this perspective, what Sylla considered a wasteful manifestation of monetary 
innovation appears not paradoxically at all, rather being the crucial axis of a more gen-
eral strategy for maintaining or relaunching the US supremacy over the world. 
The importance of this should not be underestimated: the principle international 
currency then became pure fiat money – essentially backed by the military power of 
the US –; which, furthermore, is the base of a hypertrophic layer of squared fiat money. 
The latter dangerously floats and oscillates over the world as a cumbersome excres-
cence produced by the hyper-connected semi-automatized global financial markets, 
inflated after the unprecedented financial innovation’s wave stimulated by the 
(de)regulation process globally fostered by the US especially during the Nineties. From 
our perspective, such a phenomenon represents a type of supply-induced monetary 
innovation, ultimately designed with the aim of pursuing essentially political and geo-
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political objectives. It has not been unilateral and unquestioned process, since it has 
been partially compensated or contrasted by those experiences of monetary innova-
tion consisting of the creation of new currencies or of monetary and financial alliances 
of continental or intercontinental scale – like in the cases of the institution of Euro, or 
some of the initiatives promoted by the so-called BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, 
South Africa) (Perna 2014). 
If the monetary-financial innovation strategy represents one of the two very matrix-
es of our time, the other grand source of very deep and generalized transformations – 
simultaneously proceeding, and greatly converging to the other one – is the digitaliza-
tion process. Meaningfully, both the info- and financial-spheres actually share the same 
propulsive font and strategic base: the political primacy progressively acquired by the 
US military complex along the post-Second World War decades. Ultimate guarantee of 
the monetary/financial adventure began in the Seventieths, the US military complex 
has also been the brain propelling the exploration and the colonization of a new ele-
mentary fundament of power: the ether. It has become the strategic base for the con-
stitution and development of a new dimension of social reality, internally structured in 
a new set of tools for performing new power relations, increasingly relevant or even 
preeminent in the effort to influence or determine social reality as a whole. Such a pro-
cess of digitalization of the world, based on the ulterior development of the infor-
mation and communication technology, is evolving into the obscure rumblings of the 
platform economy and of the surveillance society. That great and exuberant area of so-
cial cooperation and exploitation – that millions of millions of people all around the 
world are particularly enthusiastic to join, to animate and even to work for, almost 
completely for free (Formenti 2011) –, has grown within and through the digitalized 
cages erected into the internet. It is transforming huge proportions of old and new re-
lations of cooperation into modalities of non-monetary interactions which, nonethe-
less, do produce exchange value. Undoubtedly such an evidence contributes to partial-
ly explain the condition of deflation affecting the old fashion currencies driven by the 
aggregated demand. However, it is the highly strategic relevance of the digitalization 
process the great motivation driving the efforts and investments that huge info-
sphere’s corporations are facing, looking for the creation of innovative forms of money 
and payments systems – that could seriously challenge central banks’ regulative capac-
ities. Actually, similarly to what happened in the case of the north American British col-
onies, today the info-sphere is «in all likelihood […] the most rapidly growing economy 
in the world» (Sylla 1982, 23-24), where used and novel public financial requirements 
and regulations, tend to be perceived as illegitimate regulations exerted by external 
usurping powers. It is exactly within such a new “marginal” realm, growing beside the 
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analogical dimension of society, where we can find those dynamics and characteristics 
peculiar of the “colonial” phase of the monetary innovation excursus. Actually, the in-
fo-sphere has registered and is still performing the highest degrees of “demographic” 
growth and “real” development of the last decades. Besides, in it new effective tools of 
governing situations and flows are being successfully experimented; and new adequate 
forms of money just wait to be equipped, consistently with the specific requirements 
that power relations in that sphere entail. Hence, similarly to what happened in the co-
lonial periphery of the modern world, in the digital periphery of today, called info-
sphere, a novel wave of monetary innovation is accompanying a broader process con-
stitutive of a new whole structure of power. 
Actually, a new type of money seems to be needed, able to effectively be: a) a medi-
um for the exchange of the new “goods” produced, appreciated and circulating into 
the new social networks – crossed by, and made of, the new types of emotive engage-
ment and modes of relationship that the electronic impulses stimulate; b) store of val-
ue for the new forms that value itself acquires within those networks and in relation to 
those types of goods; c) unit of account able to catch the new elementary entities of 
the production and circulation of those goods and value. All forms money assumes 
nowadays tend to follow these paths, and they seem to be consistent with the dynam-
ics of abstraction, simplification and dematerialization characterizing its long history. 
Moreover, money is being transformed in a new thing: not only and no longer just ex-
pression of the mere information concerning the purchasing power of its contingent 
bearer, and of the specific institutions guaranteeing the purchasing power, now it is ra-
ther able to absorb an incredible amount of collective and individual information. Thus 
money gets to be indistinguishable from the information that it counts, stores, medi-
ates, entails, and ultimately is: bit and money tend to converge, and to become more 
and more the same indistinguishable entity (Buscema 2012). 
Trying to schematize the analytical elements called into question along the previous 
pages, and to apply it for organizing the comprehension of the current phenomenology 
of monetary innovation, the result would be the following representation. 
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Source: Author’s own elaboration 
 
In a complex scenario in which the most recent «Sociotechnical innovations […] have 
concretely opened the possibility of deeply rethinking money», and still remaining 
aware about «the limits and contradictions» (Fama, Fumagalli, and Lucarelli 2019, 174) 
characterizing the overall phenomenon, an effort of analytical abstraction would re-
lease what follows. It seems that, in our time, both the supply-induced monetary inno-
vation and the demand-induced one are living a phase of effervescence and diffusion, 
but – from a socio-political perspective – in very distinct ambits and for pursuing quite 
opposite purposes. In fact, on the one hand, the fiat money issued by the State (left-
upper quadrant), and the squared fiat money produced within the de-regulated finan-
cial markets (left-lower quadrant), represent the urge of the declining dominant inter-
national structure of governance to finance the provision of the needed resources – 
basically in force of its leading actor’s residual power. The deregulated area of this type 
of monetary innovation relies on a deliberated political decision taken in reason of a 
specific class alliance oriented to the production of certain specific effects of restruc-
turing of the existing social system. It is based on the function that capital’s general 
quarter – as Braudel conceived financial capital – performs through its ‘speculative’ ac-
tivities: those able to glimpse, detect, and open new unexpected journeys for capital 
valorization. The political function enforced through monetary, fiscal, and financial 
regulation, works also as a tool for fine-tuning the equilibrium between the economic 
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and political forces, among classes and social groups, as well as for managing and 
channeling social energies towards some precise practices and auspicated objectives. 
On the opposite side, current manifestations of demand-induced monetary innovation 
rely on social forces’ perceptions about their effective needs, possibilities, and desires. 
Those are polarized between experiences or adventurous projects driven by the inter-
ests of the new global companies (for example, see Baarlam 2019; Volpicelli 2019), 
which have full cognition of what new values are and new forms of money into the in-
fo-sphere should be (right-lower quadrant); and the hypothesized project of absorbing 
and guiding this new wave of demand-induced monetary innovation within a frame-
work of State-controlled public regulation (right-upper quadrant). It is the case of some 
ongoing experiments, carried out by some important central banks (Grazzini 2019), to 
which the European Central Bank could soon adhere given its neo-president declared 
willingness «to harness the benefits while managing the risks» posed by «the changing 
nature of money», by actively using the instruments provided by «the fintech revolu-
tion» (Lagarde 2018, 1). More specifically, according to her perspective, central banks 
should go «Beyond regulation», and «issue a new digital form of money [...] a digital 
currency [that] would be a liability of the state, like cash today, not of a private firm» 
(Lagarde 2018, 3). 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
According to the results of our investigation, first of all monetary innovation emerg-
es as an increasingly crucial aspect of current social, political, and economic reality. For 
that, it deserves much further studies and the development of critical thinking about its 
issues. In fact, the definition of money’s design, nature, quantity, quality, institutional 
sources, circuits of circulations, modes, and criteria of regulations, constitutes an ex-
tremely relevant battleground, virtually extended to the entire globe and to the multi-
ple current dimensions of social relations. If it has already been important throughout 
all modern history – especially moving from those areas of colonial and post-colonial 
North America where world system’s hegemonic energies were reconfiguring them-
selves –, social and political impact of the conflict that very different socioeconomic 
forces and institutional actors perform in the present within that battleground, seems 
to be much stronger than it was and could even become decisive.  
Finally, in light of our analysis, we can fix the general set of considerations which fol-
lows. The first one concerns the evidence that current monetary innovation process is 
running on the cleavage between the ‘old’ analogical dimension of reality, and the 
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emerging, increasingly relevant, digitalized info-sphere. Between them, monetary in-
novation is not simply playing the one against the other: in many relevant cases, it 
seems to be attempting a solution to such a duality and to realize their mutual ‘organic’ 
integration. For many reasons, the main central banks appear as the only agents effec-
tively able to accomplish such a historic task. Besides, current monetary innovation ex-
periences – regardless of their promoters and actors’ explicit intentions –, overall con-
sidered, from a socio-political point of view, seem to be crossed by two main operative 
logics and evidences. On the one hand, those experiences seem to be contributing to 
push forward further frontiers of capital accumulation, as well as to nurture larger and 
deeper monetization of human relations – either directly, or by targeting that growing 
jungle of non-human operations, made of those algorithms and digital procedures con-
stituting an externalized but very effective sphere of human relations themselves. 
Moreover, monetary innovation experiences help the articulation of more dynamical 
and efficient joining rings among those social discrete dimensions of ‘material life’, 
markets, and capitalism – as identified by Fernand Braudel (1979) – now crossed by 
new ties, vectors and dimensions which are redefining their structures. In this regard, 
the net effect largely consists of the blurring of the lower strata’s protective bounda-
ries, as well as the establishment of a more marked hierarchical relationship among 
them: whence the enhancement of the extractive and usurping capacity of capitalism 
towards the bottom. Nevertheless, from a tactical point of view, such experiences 
seem to be consenting the concrete experimentation and improvement of sometimes 
limited but important projects and practices inspiring more just alternatives to historic 
capitalism, worthy of larger emulation – however, again: constantly at risk of being 
soon and effectively coopted and subsumed by the articulated capitalist system of cap-
ture. Finally, for monetary innovation practices, being or becoming part of the instru-
ments for resistance to exploitation and nihilism, seems to rely on their effective ability 
to protect local social environments from the destructive and dystopian power of the 
agents and dynamics of liberal and neoliberal capitalism (Polanyi 1944; Buscema 2019), 
as well as to distinguish and shelter goods from commodities and commons from prop-
erties. 
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